The associative nature of human associative learning

The extent to which human learning should be thought of in terms of elementary, automatic versus controlled, cognitive processes is unresolved after nearly a century of often fierce debate. Mitchell et al. provide a persuasive review of evidence against automatic, unconscious links. Indeed, unconscious processes seem to play a negligible role in any form of learning, not just in Pavlovian conditioning. But a modern connectionist framework, in which "cognitive" phenomena are emergent properties, is likely to offer a fuller account of human learning than the propositional framework Mitchell et al. propose

Implicit learning: What does it all mean - Response

In the original target article (Shanks & St. John 1994), one of our principal conclusions was that there is almost no evidence that learning can occur outside awareness. The continuing commentaries raise some interesting questions, especially about the definition of learning, but do not lead us to abandon our conclusion

A single-system account of the relationship between priming, recognition, and fluency.

A single-system computational model of priming and recognition was applied to studies that have looked at the relationship between priming, recognition, and fluency in continuous identification paradigms. The model was applied to 3 findings that have been interpreted as evidence for a multiple-systems account: (a) priming can occur for items not recognized; (b) the pattern of identification reaction times (RTs) to hits, misses, correct rejections, and false alarms can change as a function of recognition performance; and (c) fluency effects (shorter RTs to words judged old vs. judged new) and priming effects (shorter RTs to old vs. new words) can be observed in amnesic patients at levels comparable with healthy adults despite impaired or near-chance recognition. The authors' simulations suggest, contrary to previous interpretations, that these results are consistent with a single-system account

Challenging the role of implicit processes in probabilistic category learning

Considerable interest in the hypothesis that different cognitive tasks recruit qualitatively distinct processing systems has led to the proposal of separate explicit (declarative) and implicit (procedural) systems. A popular probabilistic category learning task known as the weather prediction task is said to be ideally suited to examine this distinction because its two versions, '' observation '' and '' feedback,'' are claimed to recruit the declarative and procedural systems, respectively. In two experiments, we found results that were inconsistent with this interpretation. In Experiment 1, a concurrent memory task had a detrimental effect on the implicit (feedback) version of the task. In Experiment 2, participants displayed comparable and accurate insight into the task and their judgment processes in the feedback and observation versions. These findings have important implications for the study of probabilistic category learning in both normal and patient populations

Regressive research: The pitfalls of post hoc data selection in the study of unconscious mental processes

Many studies of unconscious processing involve comparing a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with an awareness measure (such as a verbal report or a forced-choice response) taken either concurrently or separately. Unconscious processing is inferred when above-chance performance is combined with null awareness. Often, however, aggregate awareness is better than chance, and data analysis therefore employs a form of extreme group analysis focusing post hoc on participants, trials, or items where awareness is absent or at chance. The pitfalls of this analytic approach are described with particular reference to recent research on implicit learning and subliminal perception. Because of regression to the mean, the approach can mislead researchers into erroneous conclusions concerning unconscious influences on behavior. Recommendations are made about future use of post hoc selection in research on unconscious cognition

Misunderstanding the behavior priming controversy: Comment on Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Loersch (2016)

There has been considerable controversy around the limits and reproducibility of so-called "behavior" priming effects. Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Loersch (2016) reported a series of 6 experiments on the effects of primes on participants' bets in a simulated blackjack game, and claimed that their findings not only establish the reality of behavior priming beyond dispute, but also demonstrate that this form of priming has the crucial hallmark of occurring outside participants' awareness and control. I describe a statistical model that does not distinguish automatic and controlled processes, but which nonetheless reproduces Payne et al.'s (2016) results and hence shows that their conclusions are unwarranted. Payne et al.'s (2016) experimental task and within-subjects design provide little insight into why some behavior priming studies have proven difficult to replicate. (PsycINFO Database Recor

A single-system model predicts recognition memory and repetition priming in amnesia

We challenge the claim that there are distinct neural systems for explicit and implicit memory by demonstrating that a formal single-system model predicts the pattern of recognition memory (explicit) and repetition priming (implicit) in amnesia. In the current investigation, human participants with amnesia categorized pictures of objects at study and then, at test, identified fragmented versions of studied (old) and nonstudied (new) objects (providing a measure of priming), and made a recognition memory judgment (old vs new) for each object. Numerous results in the amnesic patients were predicted in advance by the single-system model, as follows: (1) deficits in recognition memory and priming were evident relative to a control group; (2) items judged as old were identified at greater levels of fragmentation than items judged new, regardless of whether the items were actually old or new; and (3) the magnitude of the priming effect (the identification advantage for old vs new items) overall was greater than that of items judged new. Model evidence measures also favored the single-system model over two formal multiple-systems models. The findings support the single-system model, which explains the pattern of recognition and priming in amnesia primarily as a reduction in the strength of a single dimension of memory strength, rather than a selective explicit memory system deficit

Prime numbers: anchoring and its implications for theories of behavior priming

Subtle primes can influence behavior, often in ways that seem irrational. Anchoring provides a compelling illustration of this: judgments can be influenced by anchors even when the anchors are known to be irrelevant and uninformative. In this article, we selectively examine the anchoring literature in order to evaluate a theoretical framework which has been employed to interpret many social and other priming effects. In this framework, primes are assumed to have broad effects, influencing a wide range of possible downstream behaviors, and these influences are largely automatic. The anchoring literature supports neither of these hypotheses. Anchors have narrow effects on behavior with little transfer across judgments, these effects can be controlled, and deliberate engagement with the anchor is a prerequisite for obtaining influences on later judgments. We question whether priming studies reveal evidence for the sort of automatic and consequential mental processes that are commonly proposed. Read More: http://guilfordjournals.com/doi/abs/10.1521/soco.2014.32.supp.8

The Forward Testing Effect: Interim Testing Enhances Inductive Learning.

Induction refers to the process in which people generalize their previous experience when making uncertain inferences about the environment that go beyond direct experience. Here we show that interim tests strongly enhance inductive learning. Participants studied the painting styles of eight famous artists across four lists, each comprising paintings by one pair of artists. In an interim test group participants’ induction was tested after each list. In two control groups participants solved math problems (interim math group) or studied additional new paintings (interim study group) following each of Lists 1–3 and were asked to classify new paintings on List 4. In the List 4 interim test, the interim test group significantly outperformed the other two groups, indicating that interim testing enhances new inductive learning. In a final cumulative test, accuracy in the interim test group at classifying new paintings by studied artists was nearly double that of the other two groups, indicating the major importance of interim testing in inductive learning. This enhancing effect of interim testing on inductive learning was associated with metacognitive awareness